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Turning hindsight into foresight - our search for the ‘philosopher’s stone’ of 
failure  
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Abstract 
This paper tells the story of work using Systems thinking to study failure. It describes the 
methodological developments that have taken place in this area at the Open University and looks at 
how the emphasis has shifted from the examination of past failures to the prediction and prevention of 
future failures and the facilitation of organisational learning through the analysis of failures. It ends 
with an outline of some of the work on systems failures that is currently underway. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A wide range of Systems teaching and research has taken place within the Open University over the 
last quarter of a century. This has covered the spectrum from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ and has encompassed a 
rich variety of domains including food production, co-operatives and the social economy, overseas 
development, industrial production and information systems. However, in terms of methodological 
development the area that has perhaps made the greatest contribution to systems methodologies and 
attracted most interest has been one which is applicable in all domains: the study of failure. This paper 
tells the story of the work that has been carried out in this area and describes some of the research that 
is currently underway. 
 
2. CASES FOR TEACHING 
 
When the Open University started teaching in the 1970s one of the ways in which it was profoundly 
different from almost all other higher education institutions was the age and career profile of its 
students. Across the student body was a variety and richness of experience that was unparalleled 
elsewhere. The consequence of this, in subjects such as Systems that are concerned with ‘real-world’ 
situations, was that students were able to draw on personal experience of the same or similar situations 
to those being studied. For instance, a tutorial in the East Midlands on Emery and Trist’s work on 
longwall mining would have been very likely to have a miner as a member of the tutorial group 
whereas in other Universities at that time it was rare for students to have had any experience of work 
beyond jobs in the long vacation. The beneficial effect students’ ability to draw on their experiences 
would have on their learning was quickly realised by academics writing Systems courses and right 
from the start they adopted a case study approach so as to capitalise upon it.  
 
In adopting a case study approach one of the drawbacks encountered was the lack of availability of 
good source material with enough breadth and depth to allow sufficient scope for the rigorous 
application of systems concepts, techniques and methods. Publication of lengthy, detailed case studies 
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was rare at that time and full-scale accounts of projects in management literature was in its infancy. 
However, one area where the conduct and findings of well-researched investigations were documented 
and placed in the public domain was disasters and accidents. For example, provisions for the 
investigation of civil air accidents have been in place since 1922 and its current counterpart the Air 
Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the Department for Transport, Local Government and the 
Regions (DTLR) publishes annual summaries of all reportable accidents, special bulletins after major 
incidents detailing the initial facts and Aircraft Accident Reports for the more major investigations. 
Indeed, AAIB’s report of the Public Inquiry into the crash of Trident I G-ARPI near Staines on 18 June 
1972 which was published in 1973 was soon to become a case study for OU Systems students. 
 
Wider reading about disasters and accidents soon showed that there was very little academic work in 
the area apart from Jenkins (1969) who had used the need to avoid disasters as a major plank in his 
argument for the adoption of a systems approach to engineering and de Greene (1970) in his work 
Systems Psychology. Identification of this opportunity to fill a knowledge and application gap became 
the spur to new research, followed swiftly by the preparation of new teaching in the specific area of 
‘Systems Failures’. 
 
3. EARLY METHODS 
 
The first course in this area, TD342 Systems Performance: Human Factors and Systems Failures 
appeared in 1976. At the heart of the systems teaching within the course lay a series of ‘questions for 
tackling a systems study’ devised by Thomas. (See Figure 1.) These were used to examine cases such 
as the accident at Hixon level crossing on 6 January 1968 where an express train collided with a 120-
ton transformer which was being transported along a road crossing the railway line. The crash took 
place at a crossing that should have been protected by an automatic half-barrier. For instance, one of 
the systems looked at in this situation was the ‘transport safety system’. The main objective of this 
system was identified as the safe, quick transport of the transformer, its transporter and driver, crew 
and police from A to B. The constraints operating were: the traffic laws; physical constraints such as 
low bridges; the need to avoid damage to property and traffic infrastructure such as roads; and that the 
power to select the route was vested in the Ministry of Transport. The components of the system were 
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identified as the transformer, vehicles, the driver and crew and the police. The wider system comprised 
Staffordshire Police Force, the haulage company and the Ministry of Transport. Other road users, 
railway personnel, trains, British Railways and the physical surroundings such as hills, corners, 
bridges, railway crossings and the like were part of the system’s environment. 
 
Figure 1 Questions for tackling a systems study (Thomas in Naughton and Peters, 1976) 
 
The course also introduced a ‘post hoc failures methodology’ consisting of seven steps. 
 
Step 0 Pre-analysis phase - an unstructured examination of the details of the situation 
being examined in order to determine whether a failure exists and whether it is 
significant. 
 
Step 1 Development of a systems model/hypothesis of the failure situation in order to 
understand what happened and how it should have worked. (The systems 
questions set out in Figure 1 are used here to build up a picture of how the 
systems involved interacted to produce the failure.) 
 
Step 2 Definition of a hypothetical system(s) and its activities which is relevant to the 
failure situation and which satisfies the ‘necessary’ set of objectives. (The 
‘necessary’ set of objectives follows from Step 1. The objectives can be 
functionally determined and will probably include some of the objectives that 
were not met.) 
 
Step 3 Comparison of the actual (from Step 1) and the hypothetical (from Step 2) 
systems to ascertain where and why the system failed. 
 
Step 4 Selection of areas for further research and for experimentation. 
 
Step 5 Selection, design, and implementation of feasible, desirable 'solutions'. 
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 Step 6 Appraisal of the investigation. 
 
A version of the methodology for looking at potential failures was also included. In this the purpose of 
the pre-analysis was to determine the problems intrinsically worth studying within a particular potential 
failure area and Step 1 looked at how the system usually worked and what could happen. The 
remaining steps were very similar to those in the ‘post hoc’ methodology except they were concerned 
with what might happen rather than what had happened.  
 
The methodologies were found to be powerful and robust. They met their main teaching aim which was 
to provide a vehicle for the introduction and assimilation of systems concepts and techniques but they 
also provided students with the opportunity to gain understanding of failure situations which were 
important to them. The range of applications was huge, varying greatly in terms of scale, domain and 
type of failure. Just to cite a few examples, they included: the failure of the airship as a form of 
passenger transport consequent on the loss of the Hindenburg which exploded at a mooring mast in the 
US in 1937; the operation of a suburban health centre where the behaviour of the receptionists had been 
the subject of a large number of complaints; overhead travelling bridge crane accidents; and a study of 
a train derailment which occurred in Nuneaton in 1975. 
 
Although pedagogy had driven the development of the methodologies the level of interest in them 
within and outside the student body showed that work to develop them further would be worthwhile. 
This work led to The Failures Method (Bignell and Fortune, 1984).  This has subsequently been subject 
to revision and a more recent version will be described briefly in the next section. (A more detailed 
treatment can be found in Fortune and Peters (1995).) 
 
4. THE SYSTEMS FAILURES METHOD 
 
Fundamentally, the methodologies that appeared in TD342 and the Systems Failures Method work in 
the same way. They are based on conceptualisation and modelling of the problem or failure situation 
as a system or systems and they operate through a process of comparison. The main difference 
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between them is that the nature of the comparisons is specified much more closely in The Systems 
Failures Method. They begin with a comparison between a systems representation of the situation and 
the Formal System Model (FSM). The FSM was developed from Checkland (1979) and was first 
published in 1984. (See Watson, 1984.) It is a model of a robust system that is capable of purposeful 
activity without failure. Subsequent comparisons, using other systems-related models concerned with 
control and communication and devices for looking at human aspects of the situation, are triggered 
through this use of the FSM. The Systems Failures Method is shown in Figure 2.  
 
The FSM appears as Figure 3. The formal system itself comprises a decision-making subsystem, a 
performance-monitoring subsystem, and a set of subsystems and components that carry out the tasks of 
the system and thus effect its transformations by converting inputs into outputs. Other features of the 
model include: a continuous purpose or mission, a degree of connectivity between the components, an 
environment with which the system interacts, boundaries separating the system from its wider system 
and the wider system from the environment, resources, and some guarantee of continuity. Because of 
the hierarchical nature of the model, each of these subsystems can also be perceived as a formal system 
with its own decision-making, performance-monitoring and transformation-effecting components, and 
for complex situations it is often necessary to conduct analyses at these various levels. 
 
Figure 2  The Systems Failures Method 
Figure 3  The Formal Systems Model 
 
The stages of The Systems Failures Method are: 
 
Stage 1 Pre-analysis Definition of the viewpoints and perspectives from which the 
study is being carried out and examination of  the situation 
from the various viewpoints that have been identified as 
important.  
 
Stage 2 Identification of 
significant problems 
More precise specification of the problems in accordance with 
the outcomes of Stage 1 and structuring of relevant aspects of 
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and/or failure(s) the situation into a range of possible systems. 
 
Stage 3 System selection Selection of system(s) to be carried forward to Stage 4. (For 
the purposes of analysis, the problems are regarded as the 
outputs of the selected system(s).) 
 
Stage 4 System modelling Representation of the system using the Formal System Model 
format. (Models at different hierarchical levels may be 
needed.) 
 
Stage 5 Comparison Comparison between the output of Stage 4 and the FSM. 
 
Stage 6 Further analysis Further investigation of the discrepancies between the systems 
representation of the situation and the FSM. 
 
Stage 7 Synthesis Remodelling of the system at various key levels. 
 
Figure 4 provides an example of the output from Stage 4. The analysis was undertaken to amine the 
failures associated with the emergency rescue system as it fought to save the passengers and extinguish 
the aircraft fire at Manchester International Airport on the morning of 22 August 1985. An engine had 
shattered as the aircraft tried to take-off, rupturing a fuel tank. Of the 136 passengers and crew on 
board, 48 were killed by the smoke and toxic gases from the resulting fire and six were burnt to death. 
 
Figure 4  The emergency rescue system in the form of the FSM (Fortune and Peters, 1995, p. 114) 
 
One of the major discrepancies revealed by comparison between the emergency rescue system and the 
FSM was that the initial design of the system was not formulated effectively. This led to delays in 
fighting the fire because there were problems with the arrangements to escort local authority fire 
service vehicles from the appropriate rendezvous point to the site of the crash. Comparison also 
revealed that the provision of resources to the system was not adequate in that the fire hydrants nearest 
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to the crash site were all empty. In addition, performance information was not supplied to the 
performance monitoring system or the wider system during the event. 
 
5. LEARNING 
  
It is fair to say that for a long time the work described here was seen, almost entirely, as a way of 
looking at individual situations (for example, a particular aircrash, a specific construction project, an 
identified suburban health centre) or at groups of very similar activities or events (for example, 
overhead travelling bridge crane accidents, science teaching in primary schools, the command and 
control structure for policing major incidences). However, more recently emphasis has switched to the 
promotion of learning from failures.  
 
Quotations asserting the value of learning from failure can be found from a long list of illustrious 
sources. Examples include the following. 
 
Sir Humphrey Davy, 1778–1829 “The most important of my discoveries has been suggested 
to me by my failures.” 
 
Thomas Edison, 1847–1931 “Just because something doesn’t do what you planned it to 
do doesn’t mean it’s useless.” 
 
Carl Jung, 1875–1961 “The psychotherapist learns little or nothing from his 
successes. They mainly confirm him in his mistakes, while 
his failures on the other hand, are priceless experiences in 
that they not only open up the way to a deeper truth, but 
force him to change his views and methods.” 
 
Kenneth Boulding, 1910–1993 “Nothing fails like success because we don't learn from it. 
We learn only from failure.” 
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Russell Ackoff, 1919– “When one does something right, one only confirms what is 
already known: how to do it. A mistake is an indicator of a 
gap in one's knowledge. Learning takes place when a 
mistake is identified, its producers are identified and it is 
corrected.” 
 
Bill Gates, 1955– “It’s fine to celebrate success, but it is more important to 
heed the lessons of failure. How a company deals with 
mistakes suggests how well it will bring out the best ideas 
and talents of its people and how effectively it will respond 
to change.” 
 
The change of emphasis to learning from failure began with some work carried out for the Department 
of Health. The brief was to look at accounts of past attempts, mainly in the US and Canada, to 
introduce electronic patient record systems into acute hospitals with a view to informing a large three-
year strategic research and development programme which had been set up to establish a successful 
system at a couple of demonstrator sites in the UK. The success of this work showed that The Systems 
Failures Method could be used to prevent failure in a new system by uncovering lessons from 
elsewhere.  
 
At the same time parallel work on change management elsewhere had led to an investigation of the 
factors inhibiting risk taking. Both pieces of work emphasised the value of reflecting on previous 
mistakes and the need to regard failures and recovery from them as an inherent part of the normal 
management processes of an organisation. 
 
It has long been accepted that the ways in which an individual learns a task is reliant upon mistakes 
being made and appropriate lessons being drawn from them; the breakthrough was the recognition that 
the same model could also be applied to organisations.  Thus a “learning organisation” can be thought 
of as one which routinely gathers information about its failures (as well as its successes) and uses it to 
improve and change its structure and activities. However, even this simplistic view of learning depends 
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for its success on the quality of the information and intelligence upon which it is based and there has 
been a lack of robust methods for gathering information and turning it into useful intelligence. At the 
very least, therefore, that The Systems Failures Method provided just such a method and so was an 
important tool for improving organisational learning. This was the approach taken in the Department of 
Health study above. A discrete attempt to learn a specific set of lessons from a particular set of 
previous initiatives (failures).  
 
However the general applicability of The Failures Method permits its much wider usage in an 
organisational context. The next level of generality would be to use it regularly within an organisation 
in a variety of different contexts so that generic lessons could be learned. At present work is underway 
to identify a set of organisations that can trial this approach. The next phase of work will involve 
moving up to the next level of generality where in effect The Failures Method can be conceived as a 
method for an organisation to “learn to learn”.  
 
6. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
 
In addition to pursuing this work on learning from failures efforts have continued to develop The 
Systems Failures Method still further. Two examples of this activity will be looked at here, both of 
which involve the FSM. The first is being undertaken by Diana White who is developing a version of 
the FSM for use in the important area of project failure. She has gathered extensive information of 
three projects as they were being undertaken and is testing the model she has devised (see Figure 5) to 
determine the extent to which it explains the success or failure of each of the projects. 
 
Figure 5 Project version of the FSM  
 
As part of a programme of research which look at the application of systems thinking to modern 
policing Trevor Pearce has been looking at the best way of taking on board ethical issues and dealing 
with situations where there are conflict between the rights of various groups and individuals. His work 
to date shows that in terms of policing systems the FSM does not take sufficient account of ethical 
issues and though it deals well with conflict between the formal system and the environment it takes a 
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unitary view within the formal system itself. He is investigating whether heuristics may provide a 
platform to enable the FSM to be developed to take better account of these issues. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
So the work on failures continues at The Open University.  This paper has described its origins and 
looked at the way it has progressed. But where is it going? Sadly, one thing is very true. The work is 
not running out of subjects to examine. Every day the media bring tales of new disasters and, if 
anything, the failure rate of projects and the like seems to be on the increase. Therefore, like all other 
areas in the systems field the failures work can continue round and round the learning cycle as attempts 
to use it generate new insights and opportunities to develop further.  
 
There never will be an end to failure but perhaps if the rotations around the cycle continue and are 
productive enough we shall reach the end point where hindsight can be turned into foresight through 
the use of systems thinking. 
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